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MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS - DO THEY
CREATE SHAREHOLDER VALUE?
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OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION
The topic of mergers and acquisitions, and their ability to create shareholder value, is
one that continues to raise a fair amount of debate. Many studies have been carried
out, both locally and abroad.
They have attempted to analyse the wealth effects of mergers and acquisitions on both
the shareholders of the acquiring and acquired firms. In some instances the findings
have been fairly consistent across companies on the various stock exchanges, while
other have produced controversial results.
Generally the findings regarding the acquired firms have been consistent, across most
studies, but the results regarding the acquiring firms has been less straightforward.
This paper discusses the various types of mergers and acquisitions that a company
may undertake, as well as the possible rat ionale for undertaking such investments.
Some of the more recent and well-known studies that have been undertaken are then
discussed, and an attempt is made to find a common thread amongst all the various
studies.
Further factors which "research has found to have an impact on the success or failure
of mergers and acquisitions are then discussed, with the purpose of trying to identify
the key reasons for merger failure , and hence the failure to create shareholder value
for the acquiring firm . In other words, what are the traits or key factors that lead to
successful mergers and acquisitions, ones that do not destroy shareholder value?
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Finally, the area of divestitures is discussed, because it is often believed that they are a
key admission of the failure of past merger activity . Trends in merger and divestiture
activity are also examined .
Finally, a conclusion is drawn from the various studies and readings that have been
done . The basis of this paper is primarily a secondary literature review.
Two case studies are then undertaken; one which focus's on acquisitions by an IT
Company which fail to create shareholder value, and the second examines an
unrelated acquisition and subsequent divestiture by a listed company in the transport
sector.
A significant limitation that was encountered in doing research on the topic was the
lack of availability of recent studies undertaken. The majority of the work done on
this subject was researched during the 1960's to 1980 's. With the only significant
South African study being conducted by Aftleck-Graves et al in 1988. Although
recent articles and commentary on the subject have been written in the late 1990's, I
was unable to find any recent studies.
The majority of research undertaken has also been done in the American and
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The topic of mergers and acquisitions is one of those areas of finance, which attracts
interest from many sectors. Mergers and acquisitions (M & A's) are not a
phenomenon of the twentieth century. Indeed, amalgamations between business
entities are as old as business itself.
Historically, takeovers and mergers have come in waves that have rolled in when
equity markets were buoyant. It is thus not surprising that the past five years have
produced a new wave of merger mania.
Merger mania is dangerous. Volumes of research across international markets have
demonstrated that waves ofM & A's can destroy shareholder value.
One of the most popular myths associated with mergers and acquisitions, is that they
create shareholder value . Recent research illustrates that South African mergers
between 1990 and 1998 destroyed shareholder value. The deals produced an average
return of -20% in the post merger year. The results are better than those for the period
1985 to 1990, yet this is little consolidation. (Business Day, Aug 01 2000)
Recent research by KPMG International found that 83% of corporate mergers and
acquisitions fail to enhance shareholder value because of poor planning or execution,
or both. The risk seems to lie in the overestimation of potential cost cuts and synergy
gains, as well as underestimating the problems of integration. (Business Day, March
13,2000)
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This trend is not unique, and other studies across international markets present a
similar picture: mergers and acquisitions in the 1990's continue to destroy value.
In value theory the firm is viewed as an economic unit whose objective consists of the
maximization of profits or, more generally, the maximization of the present value of
the firm. In the current context this means that a merger or series of acquisitions, to be
considered successful, must increase the present value of the owners interest in the
firm. This is the basic concept of merger success .
Accordingly, we can say that a given merger is successful if, other things equal, it
increases the total current wealth of the owners of the acquiring firm. Therefore a
merger may be considered to be successful if the investment performance of the
acquiring firm exceeds the average investment performance of firms in the same
industry as the acquiring firm. (Hogarty, 1973)
Creating value from a merger is both an art and a science. Empirical evidence
suggests that six factors are critical to achieving success in M & A's:
• Smart Corporate Strategy;
• Effective Communication with all involved throughout the process;
• Comprehensive pre-merger planning and due diligence investigations;
• Similar corporate cultures, or the formation of a new culture;
• A focus on the people aspects of the deal;
• Real determination from management and abundant resources during
the post merger integration phase.
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South African transactions that adhered to these factors over a ten-year period to 1995
outperformed the market and the sector by an average of no less than 21% in the post
merger year. (Business Day, August 01,2000)
This paper examines the different types of mergers and acquisitions that occur, as well
as the possible motivations behind them. The major question that will then be
addressed is: Who gains from mergers and acquisitions, and do they create value for
the shareholder?
Throughout this paper the word merger will be used to mean the combination of two
business entities under common ownership .
Many people, for various reasons , differentiate between the terms merger, acquisition
and takeover. However most commentators use the three terms interchangeably. It is
sometimes very difficult to decide if a particular unification of two companies is more
like a merger, in the sense of two roughly equal-sized firms coming together on equal
terms, or whether the act of union is closer to what some people would say is an
acquisition or takeover - a purchase of one firm by another with the associated
implication of financial and managerial domination .
In reality it is often impossible to classify the relationships within the combined entity
as a merger or a takeover. Hence this paper will use these three terms interchangeably.
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STRATEGIC DEFINITIONS OF MERGERS:
Mergers may be classified into three broad categories: Horizontal, Vertical and
Conglomerate.
1. Horizontal Mergers:
In a horizontal merger two companies, which are engaged in similar lines of
activity, are combined, i.e.: the acquiring company operates in the same
market as the target company. An example of a South African horizontal
merger was the amalgamation of Shoprite and Checkers.
2. Vertical Mergers:
Vertical mergers occur when firms from different stages in the production
cycle amalgamate. In other words a firm either expands forward to the
customer, or expands backwards to the raw material supplier stage. A South
African example would be Eskom taking over a coal mine.
3. Conglomerate Mergers:
A conglomerate merger is the combining of two firms, which operate in
unrelated business areas. In such mergers companies diversify away from their
main line of business into unrelated business areas. Some conglomerate
mergers are motivated by risk reduction through diversification, some by the
opportunity for cost reduction and improved efficiency. A South African
example would be the c_9_rnbination.ofthe SouthAfrican.Breweries and OK
Bazaars.
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During the 1970 and 80 's there was a move towards conglomerate mergers.
More recently however, there has been a shift by companies to get back to
their basics, and divest from all operations that do not support their core
business. (Correia et a11993)
~REASONS FOR MERGERS
Firms decide to merge for a variety of reasons. Some of the main reasons that have
been identified are the following :
• Synergy:
A merger should result in synergistic benefits . Synergy is sometimes described
as the 2 + 2 = 5 effect , i.e.: the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. A
merger should take place only if the value of the combined entity is greater
than the value of the separate entities added together. This may be expressed
as follows:
Vxy> Vx+ Vy where:
Vxy = value ofthe combinedfirm
Vx = value offirm X
Vy = value offirm Y
Lev (1983) further classifies synergistic motives into short-term financial and
long-term financial reasons. Perhaps the most notorious amoung short-term
financial strategies, was the use of acquisitions to boost EPS by acquiring
companies with lower PIE ratios. The assumption underlying this strategy is
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that the market mechanically applies the buying firms PIE ratio to the
artificially increased EPS , thus increasing stock price.
A second short term financial consideration is improved liquidity. Companies
often acquire other firms with excess cash or stable earnings in order to
improve their own liquidity. These motives however, seem to run against the
grain of the efficient markets theory.
Turning to longer-term financial synergy, another way in which mergers are
thought to increase the combined value of two firms is to increase debt
capacity. Presumably, the larger size of the combined entity provides lenders
with greater protection, thus allowing the combined firm to have a greater debt
to capital ratio . (Lev, 1983)
• Operating Economies:
A merger may result in economies in production or distribution, such as lower
unit costs through higher production. This is often cited as the reason for
horizontal mergers. As output increases, the burden of fixed costs per unit
falls, increasing margins and profitability in general.
• Managerial Skills:
A company may find itself in a weak economic and financial position. The
failure of management to manage assets efficiently would be reflected in
relatively depressed stock prices. (Depressed relative to the stock prices of
comparative firms run by efficient management) . However, with proper
management, the firm could experience an improvement in its financial
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position . A firm with strong management resources may decide to take over a
firm currently earning low returns in order to introduce improved management
and reap the benefits of the expected increased returns . It is often found that
firms earning low returns become the subject of takeover attempts.
Conversely, from a different perspective, a large firm may decide that it needs
the management skills found in a smaller firm.
• Market Power:
One of the most important forces driving mergers is the attempt to increase
market power. This is the ability to exercise some control over the price of the
product. It can be achieved through a monopoly, oligopoly or dominant
producer positions. If a firm has a large share of a market it often has some
degree of control over price. Market power is a motivator in both vertical as
well as horizontal mergers . Even conglomerate mergers can enhance market
power.
• Entry into New Markets:
If a firm has chosen to enter a particular market but lacks the right know-how,
the quickest way of establishing itself may be through the purchase of an
existing player in that product or geographical market. Also where a company
finds itself in a declining industry or market , it may acquire new technologies
to improve its growth prospects.
• Diversification:
Diversification is often cited as a reason for mergers . A company in a
particular business field may decide to enter into an unrelated business area. It
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therefore obtains the benefits of diversification in that there is not a perfect
correlation between the returns of the two sectors, the company will reduce the
volatility of its returns, and so reduce the investors required rate of return.
(Correia et al 1993)
The problem with this reasoning is, that , short of preventing bankruptcy or
acute financial distress, paying large premiums to diversify out of a firms basic
industry should not benefit stockholders. They achieve diversification much
more efficiently simply by diversifying their own portfolios. Consequently
they are not likely to pay a premium to hold the shares of a diversified
company_QLev, 1983)
• Tax Considerations:
There are often tax benefits associated with acquisitions . One reason for
undertaking a merger may be to obtain the benefit of the tax-assessed loss of
the target company.
• Managerial Motives:
This reason often raises controversy, as it is one of the few reasons, which
does not site shareholder wealth maximization as its objective. According to
such explanations, management sometimes deviates from the classical
economic objective of maximization of stockholders wealth. Instead it pursues
its own private goals. Some of the reasons advanced as managerial motives for
mergers are the following : empire building; status; power and remuneration.
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All the above merger motives discussed will be readdressed in the main
argument, when analysing if mergers and acquisitions create shareholder
value. As the type of merger , as well as the motivation for the merger do tend
to have a significant bearing on the market perception of the merger, and
hence the subsequent creation of value for the shareholder.
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THE BASIS OF PREVIOUS STUDIES UNDERTAKEN:
THE METHODOLOGY
Mergers and acquisitions have long played an important role in the growth of firms,
and recent years have seen increasing levels of merger activity in developed countries.
Numerous theories, as discussed above have emerged as possible explanations for this
increased merger activity. They all have one unifying thread however, namely that to
be successful, mergers and acquisitions must increase the present value of the owners
interest in the firm (Affieck-Graves, Flach & Jacobson, 1988: 147)
Assessment of the effects of mergers and acquisitions on the share prices of
companies engaged in merger activity has been a source of considerable controversy
amoung financial researchers for many years.
In order to assess the markets response to mergers and acquisitions, stock prices are
expected to provide a fairly reliable means of evaluating corporate performance. Early
studies of the effects of mergers and acquisitions tended to focus on financial
statement data, but since the seventies the shift has been almost completely in favour
stock market data.
The aim of this type of research is to isolate the so-called "abnormal returns" - that
part of a company 's stock price change, which can be attributed to the markets
learning of an impending merger. The first step then is to establish the firms "normal"
or "expected" rate of return . This process begins by determining the historical
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relationship between an examined stocks rate of return and the return on the market as
a whole .
Using the "market model" to calculate the "beta" of the firm, the beta is then
multiplied by the realized rate of return on the market during the examination period
to obtain an "expected" return. The "abnormal" return on the stock is then determined
by subtracting the expected rate of return from the actual or realized rate or return
over the relevant period . The abnormal rate of return is interpreted as the markets
response to the announcement of a merger.
This technique is a reasonable one, but there are two important assumptions, which
underlie its use. The crucial one is market efficiency. Reliance on this method of
assessing value added (or lost) through acquisitions is based on strong beliefs in
market efficiency. It is based on a belief that information is very quickly, ifnot
instantaneously, impounded in stock price changes. Stock price changes are thought to
reflect in an unbiased way changes in the underlying value of the company. They
represent the markets immediate assessment of the long-term profitability of the
investment. Only given this assumption can you deduce the long-term consequences
of events like mergers from observed changes in stock prices.
The second assumption underlying this line of research is that the capital asset pricing
model (CAPM) provides a good measure of expected corporate returns to
stockholders. The basic purpose of employing the CAPM is to adjust expected returns
for the level of risk. A key assumption of the CAPM is the constancy of the risk
measure "beta" that is, beta is estimated statistically over a period running from for
example five years prior to the acquisition and up to the acquisition, and the
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relationship is assumed to hold over the examination period . Ifbeta is either not
constant, or for any number of other reasons fails to measure stockholders perceptions
of risk, then you do not get a reliable measure of abnormal returns.
It is therefore difficult to say whether the use of stock market data is unambiguously a
good or bad method of gauging the success of corporate acquisitions, but it is
probably the only reasonable technique that we have available ifwe want to use
market information . (Lev, 1983)
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THE EVIDENCE
Most of the previous studies undertaken have been done in either Europe or the
United States. In South Africa, little quantitative research has emerged attempting to
examine merger activity on the JSE. Few studies have emerged which examine the
effects of merger activity on the share price ofboth the acquiring and the target
company.
Ofthe studies conducted throughout the world, the evidence on the effects of
acquisitions on target firm stocks appears to be quite consistent across different
studies. The studies on acquiring firms however seem to provide conflicting evidence
of the effects ofmergers.
EFFECT ON TARGET FIRMS:
Studies such as those ofHalpern (1973), Mandelker (1974), Langetieg (1978) and
Dodd (1980) all showed that shareholders of acquired companies enjoy significant
positive abnormal gains, on or before the announcement of the merger bid. Dodd
(1980) and Asquith (1983) concluded that even when bids have been rejected, net
shareholder gains are still positive. (Aftleck-Graves, Flach & Jacobson 1988)
In a South African study of share price performance of companies on the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), Aftleck-Grave, Flach and Jacobson (1988)
consider the returns accruing to the shareholders of acquiring and target firms. The
objective is to assess whether firstly, mergers and acquisitions are associated with any
abnormal positive or negative shareholder returns and if so, how these returns are
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shared between the shareholders of the acquiring and acquired companies. Secondly
whether the JSE is efficient with respect to merger announcements.
The researchers used three models to manipulate the data, namely the market model
(previously discussed), the Industry model and the 0-1 Model. As results from the
three models were virtually identical, I will highlight only their findings from the
more well known market model.
In their study, Afi1eck-Graves et al (1988) examined a sample of25 mergers. Eight of
the mergers included in the sample involved the acquiring company buying out the
minority interest of its subsidiary, and the balance of seventeen were "pure" mergers.
The researchers decided to examine these two sets of mergers independently to check
for the possibility of differing performance between the two groups. Hence they
repeated the entire procedure for each of these subsets .
The results ofthe study by Afi1eck-Graves et al using the market model were the
following:
Figure 1 shows the plotted CARs for the market model using all 25 mergers. The
CARs for the acquiring companies remain relatively stable until approximately 20
weeks following the merger after which there appears to be a steady downward drift.
This indicates that shareholders of the acquiring company's earn negative abnormal
returns in the year following the merger announcements.
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Of particular interest are the periods immediately preceding and immediately
following the merger announcement. From the CAR plot for the acquiring companies
one can find no evidence of any positive abnormal returns accruing to these
shareholders. Indeed, if anything, there is evidence of small negative abnormal returns
to the shareholders of these companies around the announcement date. However, the
negative abnormal returns around the announcement date are not large and therefore it
is concluded that merger announcements, on average, have no effect on the share
prices of the acquiring firms. This in turn implies that such merger announcements
have no information content for the market. This could be as a result ofthe market
. already anticipating that the acquiring companies were likely to be involved in merger
activity and this would already be impounded in the price of the shares. An
announcement of the particular merger would merely confirm what the market had
already anticipated and hence the announcement per se, would have no informational
value to the market. Alternatively, the market might not anticipate the merger, but on
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the announcement it may assume that it was a zero net present value decision to the
acquiring company, thereby leaving the price of the shares unchanged.
With respect to the acquiring companies, Figure 1 indicates that the CARs have a
random pattern similar to that of the acquiring companies until approximately 13
weeks prior to the announcement. Thereafter, these shareholders earn highly
significant positive returns with the CAR plot attaining a maximum value in the week
of the announcement. This indicates that the shareholders of the acquired companies
earn fairly substantial abnormal returns around the time of the merger announcement.
In addition, the results presented in Figure 1 indicate that the information regarding
the merger was already available to the market approximately 13 weeks prior to the
announcement.
The plotted CARs for the 17 "pure" mergers are displayed in Figure 2. The trend for
the acquiring companies is similar to that displayed in Figure 1. The acquired
companies also display a similar trend to that shown in Figure 1 with the CAR plot
indicating positive abnormal gains for at least 13 weeks prior to the merger
announcement.
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The results for the eight "buyout" mergers are displayed in Figure 3, and are not
markedly different to those presented in Figures 1 and 2. The acquired companies in
this group clearly achieved substantial positive abnormal returns in the eight weeks
prior to the announcement although it is possible that the upward drift commenced
some time before this.
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In the case of the acquiring companies, it is possible to see a downward drift in the
CAR plot both in the weeks preceding the announcement and immediately thereafter.
The researchers were therefore able to conclude from this study: In the context of the
JSE, the empirical evidence indicates that shareholders of acquired companies earn
abnormal returns for approximately 10 weeks prior to the announcement of the
merger. On the other hand, there is no evidence of superior returns accruing to the
shareholders of the acquiring companies either prior or subsequent to the merger
announcement. Ifanything, the abnormal returns are slightly negative for this group
of shareholders around the time of the announcement.
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Finally, the results indicate that this group of shareholders earn negative abnormal
returns during the year following the announcement. (Aftleck-Graves, Flach &
Jacobson 1988)
The significant features to emerge out of this study and their results were consistent
with previous findings by other researchers. The results from the JSE were also
consistent with those from previous studies on the NYSE.
In addition, the results presented in the study indicate that the gains to the acquired
companies appear to have been experienced from approximately ten weeks prior to
the announcements, whereas other studies Mandelker (1974) and Langetieg (1978)
observed that gains from seven and six months respectively. In contrast Dodd (1980)
using daily data, observed most of the gains on the JSE accruing on the day before the
announcement. (Aftleck-Graves, Flach & Jacobson 1988).
Aftleck-Graves et at (1988) go on further to point out, that although one may be
tempted to conclude that insider trading or information leakages are the cause, it is
important to stress that this is in no way proved by the results presented. Other
rational explanations such as accurate appraisal by investment analysts and
anticipation by the market cannot be ruled out.
In a study undertaken by Limmack, (1991) during the period 1977 to 1986 evidence
regarding the effects on target companies were consistent with previous studies .
Limmack, found that significantly positive abnormal returns are obtained by target
companies over a period beginning two to three months prior to the formal
announcement of the bid. The results were consistent with those obtained by Franks et
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al (1977) who suggested that the stock market is beginning to anticipate mergers on
average at least three months prior to the announcement date.
Limmack further did a comparison of results for targets in completed and abandoned
bids. The results revealed no significant difference in the overall pattern of returns,
except that the completed bids were anticipated earlier than the abandoned bids.
Furthermore researchers had uniformly found that over a long-term period prior to the
announcement of mergers, target firms stockholders had earned negative abnormal
returns; that is the stock price performance of acquired firms was on average below
the average risk adjusted performance of the market as a whole. This finding was
therefore consistent with one of the major motives for mergers previously mentioned,
namely the role of acquisitions in weeding out inefficient managers. Findings
therefore suggest that there is evidence that acquired firms were relatively inefficient,
as least as far as the market perceived them.
These findings thus suggest that merger and acquisition activity may serve as a
valuable mechanism for replacing inefficient managers, reallocating the economy's
resources to more efficient uses or users. (Lev, 1983)
The suggestion is then, that the benefits accruing to the target stockholders is as a
result of the markets perception of significant improvements in the efficiency of
operations, which will ultimately raise the value of the acquired firm.
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Another striking result of the studies conducted by Dodd (1980) was that unsuccessful
merger proposals and tender offers were associated with permanent positive
revaluations of target shares.
Dodd (1980) found that for 53 unsuccessful tender offers examined in his study, the
average excess return over the 121 days around the transaction was 15.6 percent. It
therefore appeared that the attempted transfer of control revealed information that
resulted on average, in a significant increase in the market value of the company's
shares.
Over two thirds of these firms, were subsequently acquired within five years and
revaluation could reflect the markets anticipation of these acquisitions. Alternatively
the revaluation could reflect expectations of improved managerial performance
following the attempted takeover.
Of the 108 cancelled merger proposals that Dodd (1980) studied, these too were all
associated with a positive overall revaluation. The gains to target stockholders were
smaller that those in tender offers but were nevertheless significant.
From the results ofDodd's (1980) findings, we can conclude that there is a permanent
revaluation associated with an average takeover bid rejected by the target
management. The higher price reflects the fact that an unsuccessful acquisition
attempt is often followed at a later date by a different, but successful bid.
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EFFECT ON BIDDING FIRMS:
When we move to the stock markets reaction to acquiring firms, the situation is much
less clear. The studies are not consistent, and the evidence much more difficult to
interpret. The studies are consistent in the sense that most indicate that the abnormal
returns to buying companies stockholders are very small - though some find negative
and other find positive average gains. (Lev, 1983)
Asquith (1983) and Schipper & Thompson (1983) found that positive gains are made
by acquiring firms which engage in announced merger programmes and that these
gains are capitalized at the announcement of such programmes. In studies of
individual mergers however, such as those ofHalpern (1973) and Mandelker (1974),
there is no evidence of positive gains being made by shareholders of acquiring firms.
Dodd (1980) in fact found evidence of small losses whether the merger bid was
successful or not. (Aftleck-Grave, Flach & Jacobson 1988)
Barnes (1984) extended this view and found significant negative gains in the longer
run. It appears as if investors expectations of synergistic benefits resulting from the
merger were overly optimistic, in other words higher expectations at the time of the
merger were unjustified.
Jensen and Ruback (1983) made the following comments:
"Several studies show indications of systematic reductions in the stock prices of
bidding firms in the year following the event. These post outcome negative abnormal
returns are unsettling because they are inconsistent with the market efficiency and
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suggest that changes in stock prices during takeovers over-estimate the future
efficiency gains from mergers ."
Barnes (1984) examined two conflicting hypothesis in his paper. The first hypothesis
concerns efficient capital markets and the instantaneous rise in share prices on merger
news. The second concerns the benefits eventually accruing to the firm as a result of a
merger, arising from such things as increased efficiency and enlarged markets.
Concerning the second hypothesis, most of the evidence suggests that merger gains
are not realised. While there were slight share price gains around the time of the
merger, there were substantial and significant price decreases in the longer term after
the merger. Overall, share prices took around six months to adjust to a lower level,
which was maintained for the remainder of the analysis period . The sample group of
mergers was broken down into various groups and types of mergers, but the results
were largely unaltered.
Concerning the first hypothesis , Barnes (1984) concluded the following: The efficient
market hypothesis suggests that , in the first place, merger news was interpreted as
"good news" but, as a result of later information and the way in which the merger
turned out, expectations were substantially revised downwards. Barnes points out that
one is tempted to interpret the reversal of such expectations and valuations solely in
terms of the inefficiency of the markets and incorrect investor interpretations.
However, at the merger announcement, not all the information was available. Some
information may even have been misleading and the eventual outcome and success of
the merger may well have been substantially different from that anticipated by those
involved. (Barnes, 1984)
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Aftleck-Grave et al in their South African study of mergers and acquisitions on the
JSE, found that shareholders of the acquiring companies do not benefit by the merger
activity in the short term. The results of this study indicate that the benefit to
acquiring shareholders is unlikely to be positive and moreover, that, on average, the
actual announcement of the merger has little impact on the share price of the
acquiring company.
Limmack (1991) found that in the period surrounding the bid (i.e.: bid month to
outcome month), it appears that target company shareholders do not lose. If the post
outcome period is included in the analysis of returns and wealth changes to bidder
companies, then Limmack (1991) found that substantial losses were experienced, on
average. Limmack (1991) concluded that it appeared that both the bidder companies
and the markets overestimated the likely benefits to be obtained from acquisitions.
The results obtained indicated that the market adjusts the price of shares of large
bidders in the period immediately surrounding the bid but that the market adjustment
for smaller bidders is less immediate with wealth losses obtained over a period of up
to two years following the outcome of the bid.
The results further suggested that the gains made by target company shareholders
were at the expense of bidder companies . One implication of this result however is
that, investors holding well-diversified portfolios will suffer no wealth decrease as a
result of acquisition adjustment. (Limmack, 1991)
Lev (1983) offers an alternative explanation for the evidence that acquiring
shareholders do not experience gains. He suggests that most of the gains from mergers
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to buyers are already reflected in stock prices well before announcements were made.
Stated differently, the market had anticipated the event, and thus there was little or no
response to the actual announcement. Another explanation is the market for corporate
control is so competitive that there is practically no gain to the acquiring firm. Buying
companies expect simply to earn a normal or average rate of return on their
investment in the acquired firm. They paid the "right price", the acquisition represents
a zero NPV investment and there is no value added (or lost) for stockholders.
Others however would interpret the results as indicating a rejection of the value-
maximization hypothesis. Corporate managers conducting mergers often pursue their
own interests without regard for their stockholders. Which means that the results of no
gains to stockholders of acquiring firms could be due simply to some bad decisions by
managers . (Lev, 1983)
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THE CHARACTERISTICS OF MERGERS, AND THEm EFFECT ON THE
SHARE PRICE:
An obvious question that flows from the above is whether the level of any excess
return experienced by the target and acquiring firms can be related to the
characteristics of the merger.
Research by van den Honert, Barr, Aflleck-Graves & Smale (1988) focused on four
easily identifiable features of merger activity, which describe the relationship between
the target and acquiring firms and the mechanics of the merger and aim to quantify the
wealth effect of these four features for shareholders of the target and acquiring firms.
The features that the researchers considered were the following:
o The relationship between acquiring and target firms;
o Their relative sizes;
o The amount of prior control of the acquirer in the target;
o The medium of exchange
In their study, however, each of the four characteristics was considered in isolation for
the acquiring and target firms.
Each of these four features is discussed in order to determine why they are important
for merger activity.
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CHARACTERISTICS THAT DESCRIBE MERGER ACTIVITY:
• RELATED AND UNRELATED MERGERS:
Brews (1987) cites the nature of the business of the target firm relative to that
of the acquiring firm as perhaps the most important characteristic in the profile
of a prospective target firm. It may seem that by acquiring an unrelated asset, a
firm is diversifying which should lead to a reduction in risk. Brews and others
have, however found that firms that branch out into unrelated fields are likely
to be less successful in the long run since they do not know the business of the
prospective target firm.
The study aims to determine the extent to which wealth gains accrue to
shareholders of acquiring and target firms, which engage in mergers with
firms in related industries on the one hand, and to shareholders of acquiring
and target firms, which engage in mergers with firms in unrelated industries on
the other.
A merger was classified 'related' if the target firm was in a related industry to
the acquiring firm and the acquiring firm was operating in a specific industry,
i.e.: was not ofa conglomerate nature.
• PRIOR CONTROL OF THE TARGET FIRM BY THE ACQUIRING
FIRM:
For the purposes of their study, van den Honert et al (1988) divided mergers
into two groups, those where the acquiring firm had effective control of the
target, and those where the acquirer did not have control.
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• RELATIVE SIZE OF THE TARGET FIRM TO THE ACQUIRING
FIRM:
Brews (1987) investigated the size of the target firm as a merger criterion.
Whether size of the target firm was measured relative to the size of the
acquiring firm ('size' of the firm could be before tax profit, turnover, market
capitalization or any other measure) or in absolute terms, the conclusions were
clear. Firms should be wary of acquiring firms very much smaller than
themselves. The management time and effort required negotiating and
implementing such a transaction, and indeed correct matters should this go
awry, is usually exorbitant. (Brews 1997)
A merger was classified as 'large' if the market capitalization of the target
firms was more than 25% of the market capitalization of the acquiring firm at
the announcement date .
• THE MEDIUM OF EXCHANGE:
Firms with a surplus of cash and a shortage ofgood investment opportunities
often turn to mergers as a way of redeploying capital. In fact, failure to do so
may induce a predator firm to attempt a takeover and redeploy the capital for
them. Brews (1987) found that certain South African companies used surplus
cash for merger activity since they felt they were in a strong position. Thus the
fourth attribute investigated was the difference in wealth accruing to
shareholders of both acquiring and target firms where the merger was financed
with cash only (cash-rich acquirers) or by shares only.
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The study by van den Honert & BaIT(1988) examined a set of 45 companies on the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) over the period 1975 - 1985. They were selected
by applying certain pre-determined criteria .
The sample was then further bisected in four different ways, according to the criteria
outlined above .
THE RESULTS:
• RELATED VS UNRELATED MERGERS
Unrelated Acquisitions - Acquiring Firms: (Figure 4)
The cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) exhibits a downward trend
in the year prior to the merger. This indicates worsening investor confidence
and expectations on the future cash flows of the firm. Some 12 weeks prior to
the merger announcement, however , the CAAR shows a strong upward trend,
which reaches a peak of3% within four weeks of the merger announcement.
Investor's expectations are subsequently revised and the net CAAR a year
after the announcement is some -14%.
A justification for the acquisition of an unrelated asset that is often cited is that
of diversification and hence risk reduction. If this is the motive of acquiring
firms included in this sample then there is no evidence that the market values
increased with diversification. After all, as previously mentioned, it is easier
and more effective for the shareholder to rather hold a diversified portfolio.
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Furthermore the downward trend in the CAAR could also reflect the,
anticipated and often overlooked problems in post-merger firms associated
with the integration of two unrelated entities into an efficient whole.
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Related Acquisitions - Acquiring Firms
As a comparison, the CAAR plot of the sample of acquiring firms in the
related acquisitions is shown below (fig.5). The feature of the plot is that the
CAAR for the acquiring firms fluctuates in a fairly narrow band throughout
the period and there are no major increases or decreases in the CAAR. Thus
there is evidence that investors in acquiring firms that pursue related
acquisitions anticipate this behaviour and expect the benefits almost a year
before the actual merger.
There is some downward revision some 5 - 10 weeks subsequent to the
announcement. From weeks 10 to 20 there are significantly positive average
abnormal returns, leading to a sharp rise in the CAAR plot. This is the period
during which the target firm is de-listed, and indicates that the de-listing has
some informational content. A year after the merger; the net CAAR is 7%
compared to the -14% ofthe unrelated sample.
According to the above, it appears as ifthe pursuance of a related acquisition
policy increases value, whilst an unrelated acquisition policy deceases value.
Many of the mergers in the related acquisitions sample resulted in a
concentration effect in those particular industries. For example C.G Smith and
Dlovo Sugar. The positive CAAR exhibited by the sample could be a
reflection of the markets perception of the benefits accruing from market
concentration and the characteristics ofmonopoly power associated with it.
Figure 5: Related Acquisitions - Acquiring firms
Related acquisitions









Related & Unrelated Acquisitions - Target Firms:
The plots below (jig.6 & 7) show the samples for the related and unrelated
target firms. Both samples exhibit a strong announcement effect although the
CAAR after the announcement reaches 30% for unrelated acquisitions
compared to only 10% for related acquisitions. Furthermore, in the case of the
unrelated acquisitions the CAAR starts moving upwards some 15 weeks
before the announcement whilst most of the movement occurs from only one
week before the announcement for the related acquisitions.
The CAAR for the target firm is a reflection of the markets perception of what
premium the acquiring firm is willing to pay in order to complete the merger.
Thus management of firms pursuing an unrelated acquisition strategy appear
to be willing to pay more for the target than those following a related
acquisition strategy. This is reflected in the CAAR performance of the
acquiring firm subsequent to the announcement where CAAR's of the
acquiring firm subsequent to the announcement where CAAR's of acquiring
firms involved in unrelated acquisitions drop away after the announcement.
(See figure 4)
The CAAR plot for related acquisition target firms is negative over the 10
months prior to the merger and a positive CAAR does not develop until the
announcement. This might indicate poor management in the target firms. The
lower premium paid by the acquiring firms could be a result of poor
management in the target firms or it could be a more accurate assessment of
the value of the merger by the acquiring firm, compared to the valuation of
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target firms by the management of the acquiring firms in the unrelated merger
sample.
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For both related and unrelated mergers the gains to acquiring firms are
minimal, indicating that investors perceive no economic gains to be had from
the investment. Post announcement performance in fact shows that on average
the net effect over the period considered are negative.
• PRIOR CONTROL OF THE TARGET FIRM BY THE ACQUIRING FIRM:
Acquiring firms with prior control greater than 50%:
The CAAR plot (fig. 8) for the sample of 18 acquiring firms that had effective
control of the target at the time of the announcement is shown below. The
average prior holding for this sample was 63.5%.
Figure 8: Prior Control> 50% Acquiring Firms
Prior control > 50%
18 Acquiring firms
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Weeks relative to announcement
The plot exhibits similar characteristics to the CAAR ofthe related
acquisitions sample. The overall CAAR fluctuates in a narrow band
throughout the period with a net positive effect of2% one year after the
announcement. The fact that the acquiring firms are already deeply involved in
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the target firm would suggest that they know the business and perceive there to
be benefits from the purchase of the minority interest. The profitability
however is not sustained, and the CAAR plot exhibits a downward trend
towards the end of the year after the merger announcement.
Acquiring firms with prior control of less than 50%:
The CAAR plot(fig.9) for the acquiring firms that had less than 50% prior
control at the time of the announcement is also shown below.
Figure 9: Prior Control < 50% Acquiring Firms
Prior control < 50%
24 Acquiring firms
There is a strong upward effect some 15 weeks prior to the announcement
reaching a peak of some 8.5% soon after the announcement, but all these gains
are subsequently lost as investors revise their expectations when the true
consequences of the merger become evident.
In fact the CAAR ofthe acquiring firms was in a distinct downward trend
before the upsurge and indications are that an acquisition strategy was being
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followed in order to boost sagging performance. However the benefits from
the merger do not appear to be achieved and there is a net reduction of
shareholder wealth over the period studied.
Target firms with prior control greater than 50%:
The CAAR plot (fig.lD) for the target firms in which prior control was more
than 50% is shown below.
Figure 10: Prior Control> 50% Target Firms
The minority shareholders begin to anticipate the impending buyout some
three to four months before the actual announcement. However the
announcement still has strong informational content.
Target firms with prior control less than 50%:
For the sample of target firms where prior control was less than 50%, the
announcement effect is very pronounced and positive returns are not
experienced until the actual announcement week. Furthermore the target firms
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appear to have been performing poorly prior to the merger, a sensible reason
for the takeover bid by the acquiring firm.
Figure 11: Prior Control < 50% Target Firms
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• THE EFFECT OF RELATIVE SIZE OF THE TARGET FIRM TO THE
ACQUIRING FIRM:
Size of the acquiring firm:
An acquisition was defined as 'large' if the ratio of the market capitalization of
the target firm to that of the acquiring firm on the announcement date was
greater than 25%.
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Both plots show an upward trend startingsomethree months before the
announcement, indicating that investors are anticipating potential merger
benefits. The peak in each case is reached approximately three to four weeks
after the announcement, at a level of nearly 11% for large acquisitions and 4%
for small acquisitions.
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Thus the level of expected benefits is proportional to the stake involved.
Indications of revised investor expectations about the benefits of the merger
lead to a sharp downward trend in the CAAR from some four weeks after the
announcement, with the net effect one year after the announcement being
negative in both cases. Thus the size of the acquisition has no consistent effect
on the wealth-creating possibilities by merger, i.e.: small acquisitions are
equally likely to be unsuccessful as large ones.
Size of the target firm:
The CAAR plots for relatively small and large target firms are presented in the
two plots below.
Both plots exhibit a zero or negative CAAR before the announcement possibly
indicating poor management in target firms. The announcement effect is much
more pronounced for large acquisitions than for small acquisitions where an
upward trend begins some four months before the actual announcement. The
magnitude of the announcement effect is however much larger in the case of
small acquisitions where it rises to 38% soon after the announcement. In the
case oflarge acquisitions it is only 13%.
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Figure 15: Large Acquisitions - Target Firm
Large acquisitions
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One justification for merger from the point of view ofthe target firm is a
source of cheap capital from the acquiring firm. When the target is small
relative to the acquiring firm this effect will be most marked (in percentage
terms) and the CAAR plots for relatively small target firms exhibit this, rising
significantly more just after the merger announcement than do the relatively
large target firms.
• THE ROLE OF THE MEDIUM OF EXCHANGE:
Cash and Share exchanges - Acquiring firms:
Those firms that used only cash or only shares as a medium of exchange for
the financing of the merger were isolated . The CAAR plots for the acquiring
firms involved in share exchange and cash exchange mergers are shown in the
two plots below.
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Figure 17: Cash Exchange Acquisitions - Acquiring Firm
Cash exchange acquisitions
17 Acquiring firms
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The sample of firms usingonlyshares as a medium of exchange, exhibit
randombehaviourup until the anticipation of benefits from the merger some
three monthsbefore the announcement. The sample of cash exchange firms,
however, exhibits gently increasing CAAR's in the year before the merger,
whichfluctuate in a fairly narrow range. This couldbe due to the acquiring
firm being successful and thus having excess sourcesof cash, which it needs
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to invest. The positive CAAR's are either a reflection of the profitability
performance of the acquiring firm or of the markets perceived benefits from
acquisitions using the excess profits or cash.
Whatever the reasons for the positive CAAR's after the announcement, they
are eroded rapidly and end up negative a year after the announcement. The
decline is much quicker in the case ofthe share exchange sample. This could"
indicate worsened investor perception of the synergistic benefits possible from
the merger, or the fact that the acquiring firm has given away equity and hence
diluted shareholders holdings.
Cash and Share exchanges - Target Firms:
The CAAR plots for the target firms in the samples of share exchange and
cash exchange acquisitions are presented in the two plots below.
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The overall characteristics of the two curves are similar for both samples. The
CAAR plot for both samples exhibits a decline in the first half of the year prior
to the merger announcement. The cumulated abnormal increase in returns after
the announcement is 22% for cash exchange mergers and 16% for share
exchange mergers. The shareholders from the target firm in the share
exchange sample expect to benefit in the future from owning a small piece ofa
large and potentially profitable firm, and thus are prepared to accept a lower
premium than they would if they were being paid in cash.
SUMMARY OF THE STUDY:
The following features emerge from the empirical results presented above. In related
mergers the acquiring firms on average do not lose value from mergers, while targets
show significant gains. In the case ofunrelated mergers the acquirers lose, possibly
due to the fact that they are unfamiliar with the business. In contrast, the target firms
show massive gains. Similar results hold for the case where an acquiring firm holds
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the prior control, i.e.: acquirers do not lose by merger if they held prior control. This
may be due to the fact that acquirers who do hold prior control are involved in the
target firm and hence are familiar with the business.
When the relative size is considered it was observed that the acquirers on average lost
value by merger regardless ofwhether the target was small or large . However the
target firms gained in both instances . An identical result held when the medium of
exchange was the variable under consideration - acquiring firms decreased in value
and targets gained.
A point that arises from this study is that the acquiring firms involved in merger
activity do not tend to benefit in the short term from the merger while the target firms
do experience abnormal positive returns around the announcement date.
(van den Honert et a11988)
In a similar study conducted by Kitching (1967), the results ofmergers and
acquisitions were analysed, in an attempt to establish the underlying causes for
variations in performance. While the previous study was based on stock market data,
this study was based on discussions with top executives of22 companies, and draws
on their experience in acquiring and managing a total of 81 companies in the period
1960 - 1965.
The results of the study can be summarised as follows:
• Type of Merger:
Kitching (1967) found that there was a relatively high risk offailure in
concentric acquisitions, and a relatively low risk in horizontal mergers.
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The greatest proportion of acquisitions consists of the conglomerate type (see
Table 1). This suggested a move to diversify and spread risk, but this strategy
in itself is a risky one, as table 1 shows.
Kitching points out that although the type of merger is an important factor in
the overall success or failure of the acquisition, it is by no means the
determining factor; the primary cause must be sought elsewhere.
TABLE 1:
The types of acquisitions that have the highest incidence of failure (As
reported by executives)
(Source: Kitching, HBR 1967, p91)
Acquisition Type Percent of total Percent of Failures
Vertical Integration 3% 0%
Horizontal 25% 11%
Concentric Marketing 13% 26%
Concentric Technology 14% 21%
Conglomerate 45% 42%
• Size Mismatches:
Several executives attributed acquisition failures to mismatches of size. A size
mismatch is considered occurring when the acquired company's sales were
less than 2% of the parent company sales volume before the merger. In 84% of
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the failures studies, the acquired company's sales volumes were less than 2%
ofthe parent company.
• Synergy:
Theoretically synergy in mergers should be greatest where production
facilities are combined, because economies of scale are possible.
Combinations based on technology (process know-how and R&D transfer),
marketing or organisation (personnel economies and productivity increases),
and finance (additional and lower cost of capital) should be of diminishing
value, in that order. According to top managers, however, the ease with which
synergy is actually released occurs in the reverse order; that is, synergy is most
easily accomplished where financial resources are pooled, and is most difficult
to achieve where production facilities are combined.
Furthermore, top managers report that the monetary payoff is actually lowest,
on average, where production and technological resources are put together,
and highest where financial resources are combined. (Kitching, 1967)
Therefore, the findings in the study by Kitching, which examined merger and
acquisition characteristics from the perception of top executives who are
actually undertaking the integration, seem to largely concur with the finding in
previous studies, like those ofvan den Honert et al (1988) , which examined
historical stock market data.
Both demonstrate the significance ofmergers characteristics on the overall
success of the merger. While the two studies examine the phenomenon from
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different perspectives (van Den Honert et al examined 45 companies on the
JSE, while Kitching sought the opinion of22 top executives) , the results
clearly demonstrate that the characteristics of the merger do have a bearing on
the mergers success or failure, and hence the resultant value created or
destroyed for the shareholder.
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SHAREHOLDER RETURNS AND EXECUTIVE REWARDS:
The rationale for corporate takeovers is traditionally couched in terms of maximising
stockholder wealth and that firms will make acquisitions only if they believe it will
enhance stock prices. While acquisition decisions are made by the senior executives
and directors of the company, and not by stockholders themselves, it is argued that the
market for managerial labour will discipline the executives into making acquisition
decisions that are in the best interests of the stockholders.
An alternative motive for making acquisitions has been forwarded, and this rationale
is not directly related to maximising stock market value . The motive notes that it is
senior management who make acquisition decisions , and these managers will be
influenced by their own self-interest. This rationale also argues that stockholder
discipline ofmanagers is weak enough so that managers can pursue, to some extent
their own goals. Remuneration, power, prestige and safety of tenure are likely to be
major desires ofmanagement, and maximizing firm size may be an objective that
enables these goals to be attained. (Firth; Managerial and Decision Economics, 1991)
Chevalier (1988) argues that one rarely hears executives boast about the business
empires they have single handedly diminished in scope and size. Even in the era of
downsizing, many executives want to expand and diversify business operations -
sometimes at the expense of the shareholder. (Chavalier, 1988)
Lev (1981) argues that diversification is a method by which managers can reduce their
employment risk, and this may act as a prime motive in explaining some takeovers
and especially conglomerate mergers. Perhaps the quickest way for a company to
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increase its size or diversify into unrelated activities is to make major corporate
acquisitions . It is thus contended that some managements pursue takeover and merger
activity even if stockholders suffer reduced returns.
Firth (1991) further concludes that given the competitive market for takeovers in
countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, it should not be too
surprising that acquiring firm management may pay too much for some acquisitions in
their haste for maximising size or diversification.
This concurs with previous research done regarding the effect of acquisitions on stock
market prices . In particular, the stock prices of acquiring firms fell when the takeover
was announced and this loss was not recovered in the months afterwards. This
evidence is consistent with the scenario ofmanagement maximising size even at the
expense of their company's stock price. It is also consistent with previous finding by
Roll's (1986) , which argued that managements overpay for targets because they
overestimate their ability to run them.
The potentially conflicting self-interests of management and stockholders can be
reduced if the managers are themselves substantial investors in the company; that is,
managers are motivated by their stockholder role.
Prior research in the United Kingdom (Firth, 1980) has intimated that the negative
stock market reaction borne by the acquiring firm was mitigated somewhat for those
companies where the senior management had a relatively large investment stake in
their own concern. This is consistent with the view that management may scrutinize
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the profitability of takeovers more earnestly when they have a substantial equity
ownership stake at risk.
Similar findings were reported by Amihud et al. (1990) in their study on acquisitions
in the period 1981-1983. They concluded that bidders who experience negative stock
returns were characterised by having low managerial ownership. Additionally, the
study by Lewellen et al. (1985) found that managers whose equity ownership in their
firms was low relative to the value of their remuneration are associated with making
acquisitions that produce negative returns for stockholders.
The traditional view that takeover decisions are motivated by concerns of maximizing
stock prices and the counterview of acquisitions being motivated more by maximizing
management utility may lead to differing outcomes. While maximizing stock price
returns is likely, ceteris paribus, to lead to higher management remuneration (and
possibly greater job security and prestige), other actions (such as increasing firm size)
may have an even greater influence on executive compensation Gob security and
prestige), and these actions could reduce stock returns.
Firth (1991) points out that empirical evidence in the UK has revealed that many
takeovers result in negative abnormal returns for the acquiring firm, and this suggests
that stockholder wealth maximization might not be an important motive in some of
these acquisition decisions.
The results of studies undertaken by Firth (1991), which set out to prove that
increasing managerial returns was a strong motivating factor in acquisitions, revealed
the following:
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The results showed that to make acquisitions that are well received by the stock
market (i.e.: those with positive abnormal returns) leads to significant increases in
managerial rewards. Even acquisitions that are met with negative abnormal returns
appear to be rewarding to senior management. The acquisition process leads
invariably to an increase in managerial remuneration, and this appears to be
predicated on the increased size of the company.
Firth (1991) therefore concludes that the evidence is consistent with takeovers being
motivated by managers wanting to maximize their own welfare . Shareholder wealth
maximization appears, on the basis of the results of his finding to be a weaker
motivation in many acquisitions. (Firth, 1991)
Chavalier (1988) although agreeing in principle with the argument that executives
may undertake acquisitions, even if they are not in the best interests of the
shareholders, she disagrees with the motives behind managements actions.
"Our findings do not support the argument that chief executive officers (CEO's) have
an incentive to pursue acquisitions in order to increase their own compensation, rather
the results lend support to the argument that CEO's have an incentive to pursue
acquisitions to increase their prestige and standing in the business community."
(Chavalier, 1988)
To answer the question ofwhy managers undertake acquisitions, Chavalier examined
two private benefits that could accrue to managers who undertake acquisitions,
namely compensation and prestige.
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Despite the prominence of the claim that acquisition activity is rewarded with
increased compensation, there has been relatively little work done by researchers to,
compare compensation outcomes for executives who buy other firms, to those who do
not. Furthermore, virtually no academic effort has been devoted to measuring the
extent to which acquisitions affect an executive's prestige, perhaps due to the
difficulty of measuring social prominence and power.
First Chavalier (1998) tested the hypothesis that managers can increase their salaries
by undertaking acquisitions. To do this they compiled a comprehensive database, and
studied the effect offirms' acquisitions on the subsequent careers of its CEO. They
examined the pay changes surrounding the acquisitions of $25 million or more.
Chevalier found no evidence that a CEO can increase their salary or bonus by
undertaking an acquisition. In addition, the effect of acquisitions on compensation
does not depend on whether the acquisition increased or decreased shareholder
wealth, or on whether or not the acquisition involved diversification.
Next, Chavalier examined the hypothesis that managers can gain power, prestige and
standing in the business community by purchasing other firms. In order to measure an
increase in prestige, the authors focused on one plausible benchmark: the number of
seats an executive holds on outside boards.
What Chevalier found was that CEO's who completed acquisitions were significantly
more likely to gain outside directorship than those who did not complete acquisitions.
The results lend support to the argument that CEO's have an incentive to pursue
acquisitions to increase their prestige and standing in the business community.
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Of the 215 managers in the directorship sample who did not make acquisitions , 27%
gained one or more board seats, while 31% lost one or more board seats. On the other
hand, of the 131 managers who did make acquisitions, 41% gained seats, while only
19% lost seats.
In addition, the researchers found that managers who undertake acquisitions are less
likely to be replaced as CEO, therefore supporting the idea that managers undertake
acquisitions in order to entrench themselves. (Chevalier, Capital Ideas, Fall 1988)
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CORPORATE GROWTH THROUGH MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS - IS
IT A VIABLE STRATEGY?
The evidence already presented, although differing in the finer details seems to all
point to the same conclusion, namely that mergers and acquisitions do not create
sustainable value in the long term for the shareholders of acquiring companies.
Numerous studies have shown that corporate mergers are doomed to fail. A recent
report by KPMG indicated that more than 50% ofmergers destroyed shareholder
value, and a further third made no difference. (Business Day, Mar 13 2000)
Despite all the negative findings regarding shareholder wealth creation through
mergers, the trend of growth in merger and acquisitions activity continues to grow in
South Africa, as in other countries around the world. (Business Day, April 10 2001)
Corporate growth through mergers and acquisitions is a strategy adopted by many
South African companies to achieve their growth objectives. Research in both the
United Kingdom and the United States, has found that most mergers and acquisitions
do not meet expectations. Many fail, and are divested at considerable human and
financial cost.
Brews (1987) conducted research on the viability ofgrowth through mergers and
acquisitions in the South African market. Through his research, Brews identified that
growth through mergers and acquisitions can indeed be a viable and successful
strategy, provided a clear acquisition strategy is followed. (Brews, 1987)
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Rappaport (1979) said the following: " Companies that merely react to opportunities
to purchase are less successful in their acquisitions than those with an overall strategy
which includes an acquisition programme... Successful companies formulate a set of
acquisition criteria which are consistent with overall strategy, and then rigorously
apply them.
Researchers have identified that there are certain key elements and criteria, which if
firmly applied, can greatly enhance the likelihood of undertaking a successful merger.
Brews (1987) held interviews with 20 senior executives from a random sample of
prominent South African companies . All had extensive experience in the field of
mergers and acquisitions . They were asked to complete a questionnaire covering three
sections, namely determining an acquisition strategy, screening and evaluating
potential candidates and implementing and integrating an acquisition.
The major points to emerge where the following:
Nature ofthe Business/Industry:
Candidates indicated that this represented the most important characteristic of the
acquisition profile. Most organizations specify that candidates should be in either the
same business/industry or a related business/industry before being considered. The
overall feeling was that companies should never acquire a business you don 't know
how to run, and if possible "stick to the knitting" .
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Location ofthe Business:
Although respondents felt this was an important factor, it depended to a large degree
on the geographical spread of the operations of the acquirer.
Management Policy:
A dominant consideration here was that they seek good management and retain them.
Rockwell (1968) said the following: "The corporate asset in shortest supply these
days is good, skilled, experienced loyal management. When you acquire a new
company, the top leadership that comes along with the package is at least as important
as the rest of the assets you buy."
Another consideration raised, was the compatibility of management. The management
of any potential acquisition candidates should be compatible with their own
management.
Return on Investment Policy:
Most of the candidates interviewed, indicated that a stated return on investment
formed part of their acquisition profiles. There return will obviously depend on the
risk related to the particular acquisition under evaluation.
Minimum/maximum size ofinvestment criteria:
Here again, the findings were conclusive. The message from the executives was that
organisations should be wary of acquiring other organisations very much smaller than
themselves . The management time and effort required to negotiate and implement
such a transaction, and indeed to correct matters should the acquisition go awry, is
usually exorbitant.
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Rockwell (1968) listed Ten Commandments of successful merger/acquisition practice,
these included :
• Pin Pointing the transaction objectives;
• Ensuring that the candidates management is competent;
• Involving the CEO of the target company in the acquisition programme;
• Clearly defining the business you are in;
• Understanding in depth, both you organisations and the acquisition candidates
strengths, weaknesses and key performance factors ;
• Making people your number one consideration
Levinson (1970) ascribed major reasons for failure to psychological reasons,
including fear and anxiety on the part of employees of the acquired organisation, and
condescending attitudes on the part of the acquirers management. To these reasons
many can be added: inadequate evaluation, overhasty consummation, culture
mismatch, insufficient implementation planning and inadequate resources to manage
change. QBrews, 1987)
Brews (1987) therefore believes that if nothing else, his research demonstrates that
growth through mergers and acquisitions can indeed be a viable strategy. The
organisations surveyed confirmed that by and large their merger and acquisition
programs have been successful. A possible explanation offered for this, is that most of
the acquisitions undertaken by the organisations were either horizontal or vertical
integration, two types of transactions, which are less risky and more likely of success .
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Mergers and acquisitions, Brews concludes can be a viable strategy for growth, if they
are undertaken through a systematic, structured and planned approach. Successful
mergers do not just happen, they have to be skilfully managed and guided. An
unprofessional or 'ad-hoc' approach to mergers and acquisitions is likely to result in
disaster for all parties involved. (Brews, 1987)
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MERGERS AND DIVESTITURES:
Some observers have argued that the high rates of divestitures are incontrovertible
evidence of the failure of past acquisition programs. Others have been more cautious,
suggesting that the pattern of acquisitions and divestitures reflects evolving corporate
strategies that attempt to match perceived competitive advantages and internal
capabilities to accelerating changes in the external market environment.
The view that divestitures may be judged as conclusive evidence of the failure of
acquisitions has been expressed most strongly by Michael Porter, as follows:
"The track record of corporate strategies has been dismal. I studied the diversification
records of 33 large, prestigious U.S Companies over the 1950 - 1986 period and
found that most of them had divested many more acquisitions than they had kept. The
corporate strategies of most companies have dissipated instead of created shareholder
value" . (M.Porter, 1987)
Porter's conclusion is based on a compilation of data on 33 companies over the period
1950 to 1986. Each company entered on average 27 new fields and 80 new industries
within those fields. About 70% ofthese entries into new fields and industries were
accomplished by means of acquisition .
In order to test the success of these acquisitions into new areas, Porter calculated the
ratios of divestitures to acquisitions for each company. On average these 33
companies ended up divesting 53% of acquisitions in new industries and 60% of
acquisitions in new fields. When the acquisitions were in fields unrelated to the
companies existing fields, the rate of divestiture was 74%.
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In analysing the results ofPorters study Weston (1988) (Divestitures: Mistakes or
Learning) criticises Porters results. Weston purports that there is uncertainty about
what divestiture ratios really tell us about past acquisition programmes. Many
divestitures represent success rather than mistakes or failures . Some divestitures are
planned at the time of acquisition because of poor fit or because they could contribute
to financing. Therefore divestiture rates cannot be interpreted as unambiguous
measures of failure. Weston concludes that Porters divestiture ratios, in short, do not
allow us to distinguish reliably between those firms that performed well and those that
did not.
Studies of the market reaction to divestitures report significant positive gains to sellers
and normal returns to buyers. These results could be interpreted as the markets
positive response to the correction of previous errors in strategy. But stock market
studies of takeover and mergers also consistently report net gains to shareholders.
Linn and Rozeff(1984) have suggested that divestitures represent corrections of prior
acquisition mistakes. They found that divestiture "waves" follow one to two years
after merger waves. These finding however should not necessarily be interpreted as
challenging the value of merger activity . A firm may acquire another company with
the intention of reorganising the acquired firm, and getting rid of those businesses that
don't complement the primary business lines. Also, changes in technology and
product markets may cause combinations, which were once valuable to become
inefficient. A sell-off may indicate that the divested resources now have higher values
in other uses.
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The point of the authors is that divestiture ofpreviously acquired businesses may be
consistent with many explanations besides the "admission of poor mistakes"
hypothesis.
The table below shows a plot ofmergers and acquisitions and divestitures for the
period 1963 to 1983. The plot clearly shows the major merger wave in the United
States of the late 1960's, with a peak of over 6000 mergers in 1969. There is also a
divestiture wave that peaks in 1971 at almost 2000 divestitures.
EXHIBIT 1:





































From their study; Linn and Rozeff (1984) established a ratio of divestitures to mergers
of about one to three. This is clearly demonstrated by the graph below. (Exhibit 1)
The fact that the divestiture curve has roughly the same shape as the merger curve, but
displaced by several years, is no statistical accident. The researchers found a strong
statistical relationship between the annual rate of change in merger activity in any
given year, and the annual rate of change in divestitures two years after.
In other words, if the rate of mergers jumps we expect that the rate of divestitures will
rise sharply within one to two years thereafter. Conversely, if the merger rate declines





SECTOR: Industrial Information Technology
ACQUISITION: Various IT Companies
I have chosen Spicer Holdings, as the IT Sector in South Africa has had a particularly
dismal record for merger and acquisition disasters . To name just a few, Bytes
Technology Group (formerly Usko) , CCH, Brainware, Advtech and Ixchange have all
fallen from grace because of acquisitions that went awry.
Nature of the Business:
Spicer Holdings Limited is an information solutions company focusing on
Information Security and Broadband communications integration services. The
company consists of two international subsidiaries, MIS-Corporate Defence Solutions
in England and InterIT-Konsult in Sweden, managed by Spicer Holdings Limited,
listed on the JSE in South Africa.
Background:
When Sas Du Toit was appointed ChiefExecutive of Spicer in April 1998, he
embarked on an aggressive acquisition programme. Initially the group made three
local acquisitions (Zervos, Technicare and TCM) in deals totalling R356 million.
They also made acquisitions off shore, with the purchase of the Swedish business
Inter-IT Konsult acquired in August 2000 for R60 million.
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The undoing of the group seemed to come with the acquisition of the UK based MIS
Corporate Defence Solutions, ofwhich it started to acquire in tranches from April
1999. It initially purchased a portion of the business for 1.5 million pounds, and then
upped that in June to 2.5 million pounds . MIS had initially warranted a profit of
R25 million, but instead of attaining these figures, it was doing very poorly, with little
prospect of a turnaround.
In December 2000 Spicer and the unlisted IT Company IQ announced that merger
discussions were underway. This would have resulted in a group with a market
capitalisation ofRI , 4 billion and positioned it in the top tier of South Africa's IT
sector.
Spicer's share price climbed from 158c to 215c by the end ofDecember; obviously
the market anticipated this merger to produce very positive spin-offs. The deal was
subject the completion of a due diligence exercise on Spicer's local and international
operations.
In early 2001, Spicer issued a profit warning, which showed that certain of its
operations were in trouble. The announcement followed the completion of the due
diligence exercise by the IQ business Group prior to their proposed merger.
Their final investigation into Spicer's operations had shown gross irregularities at
senior management levels within its UK operation MIS-CDS. The Companies MD
was subsequently dismissed, and these findings were the subsequent deal breaker for
69
the proposed merger between Spicer and IQ. The termination of merger discussions
had a very negative effect for Spicer.
Headline earnings per share plummeted from 3.2c to O.4c for the six months to
December 2000, and no dividend was declared. Spicer was punished by the markets
following the completion of the due diligence exercise by the IQ Group, after the
companies announced news of the merger the previous year.
Before the official announcement that the merger was off, the market already had
wind of something, commentary by Alec Hogg was the following: "The IT firm
Spicer is about to join the growing list ofcompanies whose over-eager acquisition
programmes have been their undoing. There is no official announcement yet, but this
morning's action in Spicer shares - down 17% to 44c on heavy volume in the first
hour of trade - suggests the hoped for merger with South Africa's leading unlisted
technology company, the IQ business Group, is about to be cancelled" (Money Web,
21/02/2000).
By May 2000, the shares were trading at 9cents, from a high ofR2.lO in January the
same year.
The graph below shows the share price movement over the period April 1998 to
November 2001. One can clearly see the increase in share price towards the end of
1999, with the announcement of the proposed merger ofSpicer and the IQ Group.
Following the cautionary announcement, and the subsequent cancellation of the
proposed merger, one can see the marked decline in the share price from December
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1999 to February 2000. The share price then declines further after the release of the
Company's annual results in late February. For the remainder of2000 and 2001, the
share price has remained at these low levels. The current ruling price is around 3c, a
share that was trading at above R2 less then two years previously.
SPICER HOLDINGS LIMITED
SHARE PRICE MOVEMENT FOR THE PERIOD 1997 TO 2001
BFA-NEl Cyber Owl- SPlCER HOLDINGS LlD
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Conclusion:
An analysis of the share statistics, confirms that the acquisition actions of the
company have failed to create value for the holder of these shares. Over zealous
actions by the company during periods when the IT sector was experiencing a boom,
have ultimately resulted in the undoing of this company.
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CASE STUDY 2
TYPE: Diversified acquisition in an unrelated industry, and subsequent divestiture
COMPANY: Super Group Trading (Pty) Ltd
SECTOR: Transport
ACQUISITION: BBR Security
I have chosen Super Group as an example to demonstrate an unrelated acquisition,
and subsequent divestiture, particularly since market analysts were very critical of this
acquisition.
Nature of the business:
In order to demonstrate the unrelated nature of this acquisition, it is necessary to
examine the core competencies of Super Group.
Background:
Super Group owns the largest integrated cross-border transport operation in Sub-
Saharan Africa, the largest truck rental operation in South Africa and one of the
largest motor retailer groupings. Its portfolio includes short term and mechanical
breakdown insurance, asset financing , banking and related financial services.
In April 1997 Super Group acquired BBR Security, a leading electronic security
company, incorporating both monitoring and armed response. The initial acquisition,
and subsequent smaller acquisitions in the security industry, saw Super Group invest
roughly R200 million rand .
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The initial market reaction to this acquisition was extremely negative, with analysts
being particularly critical of the company, for venturing into an industry that it had no
expenence In.
Larry Lipshitz, the Group Chairman, tried to sell it to the market , on the basis that the
acquisition ofBBR would aid the Group in its transformation from an asset based
enterprise, to one focused on technology, services, relevant logistics assets and
intellectual capital, specifically in the high growth logistics industry.
Commentary at the time suggests that this argument was not entirely absorbed by the
investment community.
The market furthermore, had concerns about the focus of the now diversified logistics
company.
In November 2000, Super Group announced the sale ofBBR Security to Chubb
Security SA for R556 million. Chairman, Larry Lipshitz said in a press release that
the BBR business no longer fitted into Super Groups overall strategy of transforming
from an asset based enterprise to one focussed on technology and services.
The capital return that Super Group achieved on the sale ofBBR Security was
excellent, and it furthermore provided the Group with a huge cash resource.
The proceeds of this sale significantly reduced the gearing of the Group, while also
restoring the confidence of analysts, with regards to Super Group being focussed on
their core operations.
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The table below shows the effects of the sale, had the transaction been implemented
on 1 April 2000 for the unaudited six months ended 30 September 2000 on earnings
per share, headline earnings per share and net asset value.
Before the transaction After the Percentage
(cents) transaction (cents) Change %
EPS 39.8 116.5 * 192.7
REPS 39.8 44.7 12.3
NAV 351.9 420.4 19.5
*The significant increase in earnings per share is as a result ofthe exceptional profit arising from the
transaction.
(Business Day 16 November 2000)
Conclusion:
What initially appeared to the market as a poor investment decision, had actually now
turned around to be something very positive . The security business was based on an
exceptionally large annuity income, with high cash generation. Super Group had
during the course of their ownership been able to recoup a fair portion of their initial
investment, as well as use the large amount of cash generated to fund other investment
projects.
The subsequent sale for almost three times the initial purchase price also went a long
way to boosting the Groups liquidity.
75
This particular acquisition example is therefore a good demonstration of how an
acquisition and subsequent divestiture may be purely for strategic reasons, and have
nothing to do with a failed acquisition attempt.
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CONCLUSION:
From a review of all the literature presented, it is evident that the top ic of shareholder
value creation through mergers and acquisitions is anything but clear-cut.
The issue of value creation varies greatly, depending on whether the subject is being
approached from the perspective of the acquiring or target firm.
From the literature reviewed, it appears that there is a general consensus that value
fails to accrue to the shareholders of bidding firms. The reasons offered for this are
varied, but the primary ones appear to be that the market had already anticipated the
event, and there is little or no response to the actual merger announcement.
A further theory offered, is that the synergy benefits to be gained from mergers are
often over estimated, and subsequently fail to materialise.
Literature on the other hand is conclusive that value is created for the shareholders of
target firms, although researchers do not all agree on the timing of such benefits.
The obvious question that then arises is why Companies continue to pursue the
avenue ofgrowth through mergers and acquisitions, when all the literature is very
negative about the possibility of shareholder value creation. With some even going so
far, as to state that mergers and acquisit ions destroy shareholder value.
Ironically, recent business articles have cited a global trend showing an increase in
worldwide mergers and acquisition activity.
Obviously then, not all mergers and acquisitions must be viewed in a negative light.
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The characteristics of mergers appear to be an important factor in determining the
eventual success of the merger. Perhaps this is one of the key factors that companies
should consider when entering into mergers and acquisitions, as it appears from
research done, to heavily influence the eventual success of the undertaking.
I believe then, that mergers and acquisitions can lead to shareholder value creation,
provided a clear strategy is laid down and followed. These key elements relate to both
the type of merger, as well as the characteristics of the target firm. If this set of
acquisition criteria is rigorously applied, then there is every chance that an acquisition
opportunity will be successful.
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